We evaluate the impact of paid sick leave (PSL) mandates on access to PSL and work absences for private sector workers in the U.S. By exploiting geographic and temporal variation in PSL mandate enactment, we compare changes in outcomes for workers in counties affected by a PSL mandate to changes for those in counties with no mandate. Additionally, we rely on within-county variation in the propensity to gain PSL following a mandate to estimate policy effects for workers most likely to acquire coverage. Results indicate that PSL mandates lead to increased access to PSL benefits, especially for women and those working in industries where workers historically lacked access to PSL. We also find that PSL laws increase work absences for those most likely to gain coverage, but reduce absences for others. 
to support a causal link between PSL mandates and absenteeism is sparse given that nearly every study of the relationship between PSL access and labor outcomes has analyzed legislation adopted outside the U.S. (Henrekson and Persson, 2004; Puhani and Sonderhof, 2010; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2014) . These foreign laws are largely dissimilar to the proposed and recently enacted U.S. statutes and serve as poor models for the effects of expanded PSL generosity in the U.S.
Our paper adds to a small, but growing literature examining the employment effects of PSL mandates in the U.S. Specifically, we use the enactment of local and state level mandates to evaluate the relationship between PSL mandates and access to paid work leave for private sector workers.
After establishing that PSL mandates lead to coverage expansions, we then estimate the effect of PSL mandates on illness-related work absences. Our findings make two contributions to the study of the labor market effects of PSL mandates. We provide the first estimates of the coverage effects of PSL mandates at the local and state levels in the U.S. Understanding how PSL mandates translate into increased access to paid leave is a crucial first step for any analysis of the long-run effects of PSL regulations. Secondly, we quantify the impact of increased access to PSL on worker absenteeism in the U.S. The ex-ante effect of access to paid leave on work absences is unclear. The availability of PSL reduces the cost of absenteeism to workers, thus potentially increasing the likelihood of a work absence (Gilleskie, 1998) . However, in the presence of a communicable illness, increased access to PSL could also reduce "presenteeism" or attending work while sick (Johns, 2010, Susser and Ziebarth, 2016) . For example, fewer sick employees in the workplace could limit the spread of a communicable illness and lead to fewer work absences (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017a) .
We first establish that PSL mandates lead to economically significant increases in access to paid leave using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the Current Population Survey's Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) from 2005 to 2015. Relying on geographic and temporal variation in mandate adoption, we estimate difference-in-differences (DD) models comparing outcomes for those living in counties affected by PSL mandates to those living in counties with no mandate in place. Since workers often have PSL benefits in the absence of a legislative mandate, we refine our analysis by predicting the probability of gaining PSL after a mandate takes effect and using this predicted probability to estimate a triple-differences (DDD) model comparing within-county changes in work absences after mandate enactment for those with a high probability of gaining coverage to those with a low probability of gaining coverage. This method is an improvement over traditional DD estimates of the effect of PSL mandates that fail to focus on workers targeted by the legislation.
We then turn to estimates of the effect of PSL mandates on illness-related work absences.
Our results indicate that workers gaining access to PSL following a mandate exhibit substantial increases in illness-related work absences at both the extensive and intensive margins. We find similar patterns among newly covered workers in both the NHIS and CPS-ASEC samples.
However, these absences are largely offset by a reduction in illness-related work absences for populations that traditionally have access to paid leave and are not directly affected by the enactment of a mandate. This finding supports the notion that access to PSL lowers rates of presenteeism for those gaining coverage, limiting the spread of communicable illnesses, and resulting in fewer illnessrelated work absences for others. These results have significant implications for the current debate over the expansion of PSL benefits to workers in the U.S. While the direct cost to employers of providing paid leave may be large, we show that increased access to PSL generates positive spillovers that act to offset these direct costs and have the potential to improve the health of the workforce.
Labor Market Effects of Paid Leave Policies
Since PSL mandates are a relatively new phenomenon in the U.S., studies of the labor market effects of mandated leave policies have generally focused on two related areas: paid leave mandates surrounding childbirth and unpaid access to sick leave. Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2012) and Baum and Ruhm (2016) examined changes in maternal and paternal paid leave following the enactment of California's 2004 Paid Family Leave program. Both studies found that access to paid family leave increased leave-taking on the intensive margin, while Das and Polachek (2015) found persistent negative effects on women's employment. We note that the applicability of these studies to the case of PSL for all workers is questionable since work absences related to childbirth are largely planned in advance.
Evidence of the effect of access to unpaid leave on work absences is mixed. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 guaranteed eligible workers access to unpaid, job-protected employment leave for circumstances including a serious health condition that impedes job performance, childbirth, or the care of a close relative with a serious health condition (U.S.
Department of Labor 2016).
5 Waldfogel (1999) analyzed the effect of the FMLA on work absences, employment, and earnings. She found that the FMLA increased instances of leave-taking, but had no effect on changes in employment or wages. Alternatively, using the FMLA and prior state-level unpaid leave mandates, Baum (2003) reported that unpaid leave mandates had no effect on leavetaking for mothers who had recently given birth. Also examining unpaid parental leave, Han, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2009) found that expansions in access to unpaid leave increased leave-taking for both mothers and fathers. Because the FMLA provides unpaid leave and covers less than half of private sector workers, it is unclear whether these earlier findings of the effects of FMLA on work absences extend to the recent PSL mandates adopted by states and municipalities in the U.S.
Research on the labor market effects of paid leave mandates has generally focused on European countries where mandated benefits have been in place for several years and administrative data on paid leave access and work absences is more widely available than in the U.S. Henrekson and Persson (2004) concluded that increases in sick leave generosity in Sweden were related to increased absenteeism over an extended period from 1955 to 1999. Puhani and Sonderhof (2010) investigated German legislation that initially reduced and then later expanded opportunities for PSL.
The authors reported that decreasing sick pay from 100 percent to 80 percent of wages resulted in a reduction of 2.4 sick days per year on average. Similarly, examining the same reduction in German sick pay, Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) reported that the share of workers with zero work absences increased between 6 percent and 8 percent, while Ziebarth and Karlsson (2014) found that restoring
German sick pay to 100 percent of wages led to a 10 percent increase in work absences.
Due to the novelty of PSL mandates in the U.S., few studies have examined labor market effects of paid leave access for U.S workers. Using a survey of employers in San Francisco, Colla et al. (2014) found that the share of firms providing PSL coverage to employees increased from 73% to 91% following the enactment of a PSL mandate in 2007. However, it was not clear how many workers were affected by the policy change. Furthermore, San Francisco employers voluntarily offered PSL benefits at a relatively high rate prior to the mandate raising concerns over the applicability of these findings to other regions. Using a structural framework simulation, Gilleskie (1998) found that moving from no PSL coverage to full coverage would increase illness-related work absences by 45% per illness episode, but estimates from a reduced form model deviated substantially when she considered alternative policy scenarios that included combinations of PSL mandates and expanded health insurance coverage.
More recently, Ahn and Yelowtiz (2016) matched U.S. workers with and without access to PSL on various observable characteristics and found that PSL coverage led to approximately 1.2 additional work absences per year. One concern with this identification strategy is that unobserved differences between those with and without access to PSL could bias the authors' estimated effects.
Because Ahn and Yelowtiz do not rely on the plausibly exogenous (to the worker) effect of PSL mandate enactment, estimates of within-region differences between those with and without PSL access are especially susceptible to omitted variable bias. In the same study, Ahn and Yelowitz estimated models that used exogenous measures of regional influenza infection rates to identify the effect of PSL access on absenteeism, which resulted in a smaller effect of 0.9 additional work absences per year. Finally, Pichler and Ziebarth (2017b) found no evidence that U.S. PSL mandates affected employment or wages, though the authors focused on all workers rather than those most likely to gain PSL access following the enactment of a mandate. We show below that this distinction has meaningful implications for the magnitude of the estimated effects of PSL mandates.
Data
The primary data source for our analysis of the effect of PSL mandates on PSL access and worker absences is the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) maintained by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The objective of the NHIS is to monitor the health of the U.S.
population through the collection and analysis of data on a broad range of health and labor market topics. The NHIS is a cross-sectional household survey with continuous sampling and interviewing throughout the year, which follows a multistage area probability sampling design that permits the representative sampling of households and non-institutional group quarters (e.g. college dormitories)
in the U.S. Data are collected through a personal household interview conducted by interviewers employed and trained by the U.S. Census Bureau according to procedures specified by the NCHS available information on access to paid sick leave, but the survey does include questions related to worker absences. Specifically, the CPS-ASEC asks workers who were absent from work the previous week the reason for their absence. We use this variable to construct an indicator for a work absence in the past week and an indicator for a work absence in the past week due to "own illness, injury, or medical problems". We combine the CPS-ASEC sample with the AHRF, Medicare, and BLS data described above. 
Empirical Framework
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the effect of PSL laws on PSL access and work absences using a difference-in-difference (DD) strategy that exploits the temporal and geographic variation in the timing of the enactment of PSL mandates. The relationship between PSL mandates and our outcomes of interest is formalized as follows:
where Y is the outcome of interest for person i in county c at year-quarter t; PSL is an indicator for the enactment of a PSL mandate in any part of year-quarter t ; 8 X is a vector of individual characteristics (sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, age, health insurance coverage, and industry of employment); Z is a vector of time-varying county-level factors (physician supply, inpatient and outpatient days, FFS Medicare spending, and the unemployment rate); δ c is a county fixed effect, 2 % is a year-quarter fixed effect, and δ c * 2 % represents a county-specific linear time trend which is included in our preferred specifications. Equation (1) represents a standard DD analysis where outcomes in our treatment regions (i.e., counties and states enacting a PSL mandate) are compared to control regions that have no PSL laws in place. We cluster our standard errors at the county level in all analyses.
Our dependent variable, ! ",$,% in Equation (1) represents one of several possible outcomes.
We initially estimate the effect of PSL laws on access to PSL measured by whether a worker in our sample reports having PSL benefits at their main job. Our hypothesis is that a PSL mandate should 8 We define enactment of a PSL mandate as the year-quarter in which the mandate actually took effect.
increase the share of workers reporting access to PSL. However, if PSL mandate adoption is focused in areas where private employers display a high likelihood of offering PSL, then we may find a relatively small effect of the mandate. Additionally, employers may attempt to avoid a mandate by relocating or restructuring their workforce, which would also negate access effects of a mandate.
After examining the effect of PSL mandates on worker access to paid leave, we then estimate the effect of mandates on work absences using both the NHIS and CPS-ASEC data. In the NHIS data, we examine changes in the probability of reporting any work absences due to illness or injury (excluding pregnancy-related absences) in the past 12 months, 2 or more work absences, 5 or more work absences, and 10 or more work absences. The CPS-ASEC does not include information on the intensive margin of work absences, so we are only able to analyze changes in the probability of any work absence in the past week. Another modification we make when examining work absences is to exclude the first 12 months after the mandate took effect. This is because all of the mandates in our study include provisions requiring workers to accrue PSL over an extended period of time (e.g. 1 hour of PSL for every 30 hours worked). We therefore expect any effect of PSL mandates on work absences to be delayed as a result of these accrual periods. This pattern is confirmed in event study estimates presented below. Results for work absences that include the year of adoption are similar to our main results, though the magnitude of the effect is attenuated. These estimates are available upon request.
A potential challenge to the validity of our DD specification is the endogenous adoption of PSL mandates. For example, if a municipality's population demographics (e.g., share of service industry workers or underlying health of the population) are changing over time in unobserved ways, and this change leads to the adoption of a PSL mandate, then our estimates of the effect of PSL legislation on labor market and health outcomes would be biased. To gauge the potential for policy exogeneity we use data from the CPS-ASEC along with information on county-level, unemployment rates, and proxies for population health to regress PSL adoption on several observable county-level characteristics that would plausibly be related to the adoption of a PSL mandate. 9 Specifically, we examine the association between the enactment of a PSL law and county-level estimates of population age, race/ethnicity, education, and income; per capita hospital inpatient days, per capita outpatient visits, and total Medicare spending for parts A and B; 10 county-level unemployment rates;
and industry of employment. While not a definitive test of the exogeneity of the PSL mandates that we study, an inability to explain the variation in the adoption of PSL laws with a rich set of observable population characteristics lends support to our assertion that our identification strategy returns causal estimates of the effect of PSL mandates (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2012) .
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 2 . Column (1), which omits county fixed effects and county time trends, indicates that the share of the population with VA health insurance coverage and the share of the population working in agricultural industries is negatively associated with the enactment of a PSL mandate (p<0.05). The addition of county fixed effects in Column (2) attenuates the explanatory power of our industry indicators and leaves only gender, race, V.A.
coverage, and Medicare spending as moderately significant predictors of PSL mandates. Finally, we add county time trends in Column (3) and find that only Medicare spending is associated with PSL mandate adoption. If the positive association between Medicare spending and PSL regulation indicates that counties with unobservably sicker populations were more likely to adopt a PSL mandate, then estimates of the effect of PSL adoption on health care utilization could be biased.
However, we control for Medicare spending in our preferred specifications to minimize any potential bias that might arise. We also note that, despite the inclusion of county fixed effects and county time trends in Column (3), the R-squared indicates that much of the variation in PSL mandate adoption is unexplained by demographic and county-level observables and, therefore, suggests substantial random variation in PSL adoption to be leveraged in our estimation strategy.
In addition to policy exogeneity, another necessary assumption for the validity of our DD model is that the treatment and control groups would have followed the same trends (in terms of the outcome variables) had the adoption of a PSL mandate not occurred. This assumption is untestable, as it is impossible to observe the treatment group in the untreated state during the posttreatment period; however, evidence that these two groups followed similar trends in the outcome variables in the pre-PSL period lends credence to our estimation strategy. To assess whether trends in our outcomes were similar in the pre-enactment period for our treatment and control counties, we estimate a model similar to Equation (1) that replaces the PSL term with an interaction between an indicator for whether a county ever enacts a PSL mandate and a continuous measure of the yearquarter limiting the sample to the years before PSL mandates went into effect. A lack of statistical significance on this interaction term indicates that no measurable difference in pre-policy trends exists between the treatment and control counties. We report the results of this parallel trends test along with our estimates of Equation (1) below.
Results & Supplementary Analyses
Before turning to our DD estimates from Equation (1), we present unadjusted visual evidence of the effect of PSL mandates on PSL access and work absences in Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 plots the share of workers who report that they have access to PSL at their main job for those in both the treatment and control counties. Figure 1 is centered about the year-quarter of PSL mandate enactment for the treatment counties and a "pseudo-enactment" period for the control counties that randomly assigns each control county to the year-quarter of mandate enactment for a county in the treatment group. The visual evidence in Figure 1 suggests that workers in counties that would go on to enact a PSL mandate had greater access to PSL in the periods before the mandates took effect.
Pre-period trends in PSL access are relatively similar for the treatment and control counties, though the treatment counties show signs of increasing PSL access in the year immediately preceding the enactment of a mandate. Despite this potential evidence of policy anticipation in the unadjusted means, we find no evidence of diverging trends in the pre-period in our regression analyses or in event-study estimates of work absences discussed below. Figure 1 suggests that after the PSL mandates took effect, workers in the treatment counties were more likely to report having access to PSL and that PSL access continued to increase for the first 3 years before a slight downturn between years 3 and 4 post-enactment. Workers in the control counties show no similar increase in PSL access. Figure 2 plots the share of workers with a work absence in the past 12 months due to an illness or injury. The share of workers reporting at least one work absence in both the treatment and control counties increased between 4 and 2 years prior to PSL mandate enactment, with a larger increase for those in treatment counties, before leveling off in the two years immediately preceding the PSL mandates. Workers in treatment counties show no significant change in work absences in the year following a PSL mandate, but the share of workers with at least one absence over the past 12 months rises steeply in treatment counties after the first year. This pattern is consistent with the requirement that workers must accrue PSL hours over time and motivates our decision to exclude the first 12 months post-enactment in our regression analyses of work absences. Columns (1) through (3), but the inflated standard error in this specification results in a loss of statistical significance. In all four specifications, our parallel trends test finds no evidence that trends in PSL access were significantly different for treatment and control counties prior to the mandates taking effect.
Motivated by evidence that women are more responsive than men to changes in PSL policies, we explore the possibility of heterogeneous impacts of PSL mandates in Table 4 (Henrekson and Persson, 2004 ). Here we split the sample into 5 subgroups and examine the effect of PSL mandates separately for: women, men, white non-Hispanics, non-whites or Hispanics, and workers in industries with historically low access to PSL. 11 Regression specifications in Table 4 are analogous to Column (4) in Table 3 and include demographic, industry, and county controls, and county time trends. The results in Table 4 suggest that while the effect of PSL mandates may differ slightly across gender or race/ethnicity, the differences appear to be rather small. The coefficient estimate for PSL mandates is statistically significant at the 5% level for women and is not statistically significant for men, though the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively similar. White, nonHispanic workers see a 4.9 percentage point increase in PSL access as a result of a mandate compared to a 3.6 percentage point increase for non-white, Hispanic workers. Lastly, Column (5) indicates that, as expected, those working in industries where access to PSL was uncommon prior to a mandate see a large, 8 percentage point gain in PSL access following the enactment of a mandate.
We next turn to the second phase of our analysis, which includes estimates of the effect of PSL mandates on work absences in the past 12 months due to illness or injury in Table 5 . The odd numbered columns in Table 5 omit the county time trends, while county time trends are included in the even numbered specifications. We estimate separate regressions for any work loss days, 2 or more work loss days, 5 or more work loss days, and 10 or more work loss days. We generally find no effect of PSL mandates on work loss days in our DD models and note that several of the specifications in Table 5 fail to exhibit parallel trends between the treatment and control counties in the pre-enactment period.
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 consistently indicate that workers in counties that enact PSL mandates report greater access to PSL compared to workers in counties with no mandated PSL requirement. However, since a large share of workers in our sample reported access to PSL in the absence of mandate, our results likely underestimate the gain in PSL access for those most affected by mandatory PSL legislation. This notion is supported by the much larger effect we estimate for workers in low-PSL industries. To shed additional light on the effect of a PSL mandate on PSL access and work absences for those most likely to benefit from the legislation we modify our empirical strategy and estimate a triple-difference (DDD) model that allows the effect of a PSL mandate to differ by the probability that a worker lacks access to PSL prior to the mandate taking effect. 12 The first step in our DDD analysis is to estimate the probability that a worker in our sample lacks PSL coverage using data from time periods before actual adoption for our treatment counties or before the randomly assigned pseudo-enactment date for control counties. We use a logistic regression model that includes the same individual demographic characteristics found in Equation
(1), as well as income, firm size, and codes for specific industry of employment. 13 After obtaining the predicted probability that a worker lacks PSL coverage, we estimate the following DDD specification: Equation (2) is similar to Equation (1) but allows the effect of PSL mandate enactment to vary by the probability of lacking PSL coverage prior to mandate enactment. Specifically, the coefficient of interest, ) = , measures the impact of a PSL mandate on an individual who is predicted to gain PSL coverage. The coefficient ) 5 represents the effect of mandate enactment on those with PSL coverage prior to the mandate (i.e., predicted probability of lacking PSL access equals zero). The coefficient ) 6 is then the difference in outcomes for those with no PSL benefits compared to those with PSL benefits when no mandate is in place. Notably, the coefficients from our DD and DDD models are not directly comparable. The DD coefficient of interest in Equation (1) measures the effect of a PSL 12 We choose to conduct a DDD analysis rather than simply examining work absences for those in low-PSL industries for two reasons: first, there may be characteristics besides industry associated with the likelihood of PSL coverage that would be captured by our predication model; and second, limiting our sample to low-PSL industries reduces our sample size by more than half. The DDD model allows us to retain our full sample while focusing specifically on those most likely to be affected by PSL legislation. 13 We exclude income and firm size from our main analyses because it may be related to the enactment of a PSL mandate. We include both in our probability model since we estimate this model for the time before any PSL mandate.
Estimates for this prediction model are reported in Appendix Table 3. mandate on workers in treatment counties compared to workers in control counties (in other words, this is an intent-to-treat estimate). The DDD coefficient of interest in Equation (2) estimates the effect of a PSL mandate on workers in treatment counties who are more likely to gain PSL compared to those in treatment counties who are less likely to gain PSL (i.e., a treatment-on-thetreated effect). Table 6 displays results from our DDD model on the effect of PSL mandates on PSL access for those most likely to be affected by a mandate. Column (1) contains results from a specification that includes demographic and county controls, but omits industry controls and county time trends.
Column (2) 14 After confirming that PSL mandates increase access to paid leave and that the effect is larger for those most likely to gain coverage, we again turn to the effect of PSL mandates on work absences by re-estimating our DDD model in Equation (2) using work loss days in the past 12 months for illness or injury as the dependent variable. Results are included in Table 7 . Columns (1) and (2) contain estimates for the effect of PSL mandates on reporting any work loss days in the past 12 months due 14 The parallel trends test for the DDD model is similar to that described for the DD model except that we now interact the indicator for whether a county ever adopts a PSL mandate with both the continuous year measure and with the Prob.(PSL) variable from Equation (3) . We also include all two-way interactions between these variables.
to illness or injury. When county time trends are omitted in Column (1), we find that those who are most likely to lack PSL coverage are less likely to report any work loss days in the absence of a PSL mandate. This finding is consistent with earlier research indicating those with no access to PSL are less likely to miss work when ill (DeRigne et al., 2016; Susser and Ziebarth, 2016) . Estimates of the interaction term in Columns (1) and (2) show no statistically significant increase in the probability of experiencing a work loss day after the enactment of a PSL mandate for those most likely to be affected, though the coefficient is positive. Interestingly, the coefficient on the indicator for whether a county has enacted a PSL mandate is negative and statistically significant. This estimate represents the impact of a PSL mandate on those who already have PSL coverage in place. While we expected this coefficient to be zero in regressions of PSL mandates on PSL access, in this case that expectation would no longer hold. If access to PSL reduces instances of presenteeism and the spread of communicable disease, then those with existing PSL access could plausibly benefit from a mandate. We return to this point below, but note that others have found evidence that PSL mandates reduce presenteeism through disease transmission rates (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017a) . Our estimate in Column (1) suggests that the enactment of a PSL mandate reduces the likelihood of a work absence due to illness or injury by 4.2 percentage points, a reduction of approximately 10%.
When we add county time trends to our specification in Column (2), this effect is no longer statistically significant, but the sign of the coefficient is still negative and similar in magnitude.
Moving to Columns (3) and (4), it appears that PSL mandates increase the probability that those most likely to gain PSL access report at least 2 work loss days due to illness or injury by approximately 4.6 percentage points. This effect is quite large in relative terms, representing a 13.4%
increase off of the sample mean, and is largely unaffected by the inclusion of county time trends in the regression model. Columns (5) and (6) suggest that the positive relationship between PSL mandates and work loss days for the targeted population continues when moving to 5 or more work loss days. Here the effect of the mandate is still large in magnitude, though only borderline statistically significant. Finally, Columns (7) and (8) contain estimates for 10 or more work loss days.
Coefficient estimates are now quite small and statistically insignificant, indicating no effect of PSL mandates on 10 or more work loss days.
While our findings indicate that PSL mandates increase work absences for those gaining access to PSL coverage, the relatively small sample sizes in the NHIS mean that our estimates are somewhat imprecise. To address this concern, we supplement our estimates from the NHIS with data from the CPS-ASEC, which affords us a much larger sample for our analysis. While the CPS-ASEC significantly increases our sample size, the survey contains only very limited information on access to PSL. 15 Therefore, we use the NHIS to calculate the mean rate of PSL access in the absence of a mandate for 30 separate groups defined by age (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64) , education (high school or less, some college, and college graduate), and gender. We then estimate the following version of Equation (3) Where Prob.(PSL) g is the mean rate of PSL access for each of the 30 groups, l g is an indicator for each of the 30 groups, and all of the remaining variables are as previously defined. In this specification, ) 6 , measures the effect of a PSL mandate on those gaining PSL coverage. To calculate the dependent variable in Equation (3) we follow the BLS definition of a work absence, which includes "instances when persons who usually work 35 or more hours per week worked less than 35 hours during the reference week". Additionally, the CPS-ASEC asks the reason for this reduction in work hours and we use this information to construct a measure of work absences due to "illness or health/medical limitation".
Results for reporting any illness-related work absence using the CPS-ASEC sample are presented in Table 8 . The first column includes coefficient estimates from a DD model similar to Equation (1), while Columns 2 through 5 contain estimates from the DDD model described in Equation (3). DD estimates in Column (1) indicate a small negative effect of PSL mandates on work absences for workers in treatment counties compared to those in control counties. The coefficient is marginally statistically significant, though small in magnitude, and suggests that the overall effect of mandate enactment on work absences is negligible. The DDD estimates in Table 8 , however, show strong effects of mandates for both those gaining access and those with existing PSL coverage in the absence of a mandate. Our estimates suggest that PSL mandates increase the likelihood of an illnessrelated work absence in the past week by 2.5 percentage points for those gaining coverage, a relative increase of nearly 140%, compared to those with prior PSL coverage. This finding is similar to our earlier estimates of the effect of PSL mandates on work absences using the NHIS data reported in
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 . In addition, estimates of the coefficient on the PSL mandate term in Table 8 indicate that the enactment of a mandate affects the probability of a work absence for those with existing PSL coverage. Following a PSL mandate, those unaffected workers see a decline in the likelihood of reporting an illness-related work absence of nearly 2 percentage points. Though identifying the mechanism for this spillover effect is beyond the scope of this paper, we note that these results are consistent with evidence that PSL mandates reduce presenteeism and the transmission of contagious illnesses (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017a) .
Finally, Figure 3 plots event study estimates of the effect of a PSL mandate on the likelihood of an illness-related work absence in the past week using the CPS-ASEC data. We estimate an event study model similar to Equation (3), but include individual interactions with years immediately preceding and following a county's adoption of a PSL mandate. We designate period 0 as the year in which the mandate took effect and omit the preceding year so that coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the change in work absences compared to the year before the enactment of a PSL mandate. The coefficients are then plotted for the three years following the mandate's enactment and three years preceding enactment. The coefficient estimates in Figure 3 represent the effect of PSL mandates on illness-related work absences for those most likely to gain PSL coverage compared to those with PSL coverage in place prior to a mandate. Figure 3 shows no evidence of a change in illness-related work absences for those gaining coverage in the periods before a mandate took effect.
However, we see a slight increase in the likelihood of an illness-related work absence occurring in the year that the mandate took effect (period 0) and a large increase in the first full year following the mandates enactment (period 1). Compared to those unaffected by the mandate, those gaining coverage increase their probability of reporting an illness-related work absence by approximately 5 percentage points in period 1. The increase in work absences for the affected group falls in the second year after the mandate becomes effective and then rises again in the third year. We highlight two additional features of the event-study model that relate to our previous analyses. First, a lack of a pre-period effect on work absences indicates that firms are not increasing their PSL coverage in anticipation of mandate enactment and, secondly, we appear to be justified in omitting the year of enactment from our earlier models. Since PSL accrues over time, many workers will not have access to paid leave days for several months following the enactment of a mandate.
Discussion
Legislative mandates for paid sick leave ( have banned municipal-level PSL mandates citing concerns over costs to businesses and rising rates of employee absenteeism (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017b) . Evidence to support these concerns, however, is minimal as the relationship between PSL mandates in the U.S. and labor market outcomes remains unclear.
Our goal in this paper was to first establish a link between the enactment of a PSL mandate and access to PSL coverage. Since many employers provide PSL benefits in the absence of a mandate, the effect on access to coverage is not evident ex-ante and represents a crucial first-step to quantifying the labor market effects of PSL mandates. Furthermore, if firms respond to costly mandates by altering their workforce or relocating, then any change in access to PSL benefits would be minimal. Our results indicate that, overall, PSL mandates increase access to paid leave by 4.1
percentage points compared to counties where no mandate exists. This represents a relative increase in PSL coverage of approximately 7 percent and is concentrated among women, white nonHispanics, and those working in industries with low levels of PSL coverage prior to the mandate.
The finding that mandates are associated with small gains in PSL coverage can explain why studies of the supply-side labor market effects of PSL mandates in the U.S. have found minimal impacts on employment and wages (Ahn and Ylowitz, 2015; Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017b) . However, when we shift our focus to those most affected by a mandate, we find that the effect of a PSL mandate on access to coverage nearly doubles to 7.4 percentage points; a relative increase of 13 percent. This much more substantial effect highlights the importance of concentrating on the population targeted by the mandates.
We then turn to the relationship between PSL access and the likelihood that a worker reports an illness-related work absence. Overall, our difference-in-differences models suggest that PSL mandates are associated with a small decline in illness-related work absences, though some specifications fail to satisfy the assumption of parallel trends in the pre-period. In an effort to refine our analysis, we estimate a triple-difference model that allows us to observe the effects of PSL mandates on those gaining coverage and on those with a high likelihood of PSL coverage prior to mandate enactment. Our application of this strategy is novel to the literature on PSL and provides a unique perspective on potential spillovers to populations not directly affected by a PSL mandate.
Using two distinct datasets, we find strikingly similar results: workers gaining access to PSL benefits following the enactment of a mandate are approximately 2.5 percentage points more likely to report a recent illness-related work absence. Estimates from an event-study model suggest that much of the effect on absences occurs in the calendar year following the enactment of a mandate, which is consistent with an initial accrual period; a feature that is common to all of the mandates that we study. When examining intensive margin changes in absenteeism, we find particularly large effects at the thresholds of reporting at least 2 work absences and at least 5 work absences. This effect declines monotonically from at least 2 work absences and becomes small and statistically insignificant at 10 or more work absences.
As expected, we find no access effect for those with a high probability of PSL coverage prior to a mandate. However, our results indicate that a PSL mandate is associated with fewer illness-related work absences for those with prior coverage. The magnitude of the estimated effect is similar in size to the increase in work absences for those gaining PSL access. Though we are not able to directly test the mechanism that drives these reductions in illness-related work absences, we note that this 1. Year 0 represents the quarter and year that the PSL mandate took effect in treatment counties. Control counties are assigned a "pseudo-enactment" period matched to the quarter and year of enactment for a random treatment county. 2. A work absence is defined as a work loss day to an injury or illness and is calculated as the unadjusted mean rate of workers in the sample who report a work loss day in the past 12 months.
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